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Abstract
The proliferation of networked devices, systems, and appli-
cations that we depend on every day makes managing net-
works more important than ever. The increasing security,
availability, and performance demands of these applications
suggest that these increasingly difficult network management
problems be solved in real time, across a complex web of
interacting protocols and systems. Alas, just as the impor-
tance of network management has increased, the network
has grown so complex that it is seemingly unmanageable. In
this new era, network management requires a fundamentally
new approach. Instead of optimizations based on closed-form
analysis of individual protocols, network operators need data-
driven, machine-learning-based models of end-to-end and
application performance based on high-level policy goals and
a holistic view of the underlying components. Instead of
anomaly detection algorithms that operate on offline analysis
of network traces, operators need classification and detec-
tion algorithms that can make real-time, closed-loop deci-
sions. Networks should learn to drive themselves. This paper
explores this concept, discussing how we might attain this
ambitious goal by more closely coupling measurement with
real-time control and by relying on learning for inference
and prediction about a networked application or system, as
opposed to closed-form analysis of individual protocols.
1 Introduction
Modern networked applications operate at a scale and scope
we have never seen before. Virtual and augmented reality
require real-time responsiveness, micro-services deployed
using containers introduce rapid changes in traffic workloads,
and the Internet of Things (IoT) significantly increases the
number of connected devices while also raising new security
and privacy concerns. The widespread integration of these
applications into our daily lives raises the bar for network
management, as users elevate their expectations for real-time
interaction, high availability, resilience to attack, ubiquitous
access, and scale. Network management has always been a
worthwhile endeavor, but now it is mission critical.
Yet, network management has remained a Sisyphean task.
Network operators develop and use scripts and tools to help
them plan, troubleshoot, and secure their networks, as user de-
mands and network complexity continue to grow. Networking
researchers strive to improve the tuning, design, and measure-
ment of network protocols, yet we continue to fall behind
the curve, as the protocols, variable network conditions, and
relationships between them and user quality of experience be-
come increasingly complex. Twenty years ago, we had some
hope of (and success in) creating clean, closed-form mod-
els of individual protocols, applications, and systems [4, 24];
today, many of these are too complicated for closed-form anal-
ysis. Prediction problems such as determining how search
query response time would vary in response to the placement
of a cache are much more suited to statistical inference and
machine learning based on measurement data [29].
Of course, we must change the network to make network
management easier. We have been saying this for years, as we
continue to fall behind the curve. Part of the problem, we be-
lieve, is the continued focus on designing, understanding, and
tweaking individual protocols—we focus on better models
for BGP, optimizations for TCP, QUIC, DNS, or the protocols
du jour. In fact, our troubles do not lie in the protocols. The
inability to model holistic network systems, as opposed to
individual protocols, has made it difficult for operators to un-
derstand what is happening in the network. Software-Defined
Networking (SDN) helps by offering greater programmability
and centralized control, yet controller applications still rely
on collecting their own data and installing low-level match-
action rules in switches and SDN does not change the fact
that real networked systems are too complex to analyze with
closed-form models.
As networking researchers, we must change our approach
to these problems. An ambitious goal for network manage-
ment is that of a self-driving network—one where (1) net-
work measurement is task-driven and tightly integrated with
the control of the network; and (2) network control relies
on learning and large-scale data analytics of the entire net-
worked system, as opposed to closed-form models of individ-
ual protocols. Recent initiatives have proffered this high-level
goal [14, 28], drawing an analogy to self-driving cars, which
can make decisions that manage uncertainty and mitigate risk
to achieve some task (e.g., transportation to some destination).
This paper explores this goal in detail, developing the techni-
cal requirements for and properties of a self-driving network
and outlining a broad, cross-disciplinary research agenda for
the community that can move us closer to realizing this goal.
The networking research community has been developing
the pieces of this puzzle for many years, from predictive mod-
els of application performance [19, 29] to statistical anomaly
and intrusion detection algorithms based on analysis of net-
work traffic [2, 7]. The state of the art, however, merely
lays the foundation for the much more ambitious agenda of
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creating a truly self-driving network. Today, measurement
remains decoupled from network control, inevitably placing
the network operator in the middle of the control loop and
introducing uncertainty and the possibility for error. Taking
the technologies that we have and making them both real-time
and distributed introduces entirely new classes of challenges,
in networking and more broadly across computer science:
Deriving measurement, inference, and control from high-
level policy: A self-driving network should take as input
a high-level goal related to (say) performance or security
and jointly derive (1) the measurements that the network
should collect, (2) the inferences that should be performed,
and (3) the decisions that the network should ultimately ex-
ecute. Section 2 describes new directions in programming
language abstractions and programmatic control over net-
works that might ultimately enable these capabilities.
Performing automated, real-time inference: The past ten
years has demonstrated significant promise in using machine
learning to both detect and predict network attacks; we must
build on the increasing amount of work in automated infer-
ence in network management ultimately integrating it into a
control loop that can enable more automated decision-making.
Section 3 describes two facets of these challenges: (1) using
learning to improve network management and (2) designing
the network to improve the quality of data that provides the in-
put to learning algorithms. In a self-driving network, Quality
of Data (QoD) is a prerequisite for quality of service (QoS)
and, ultimately, the user’s quality of experience (QoE).
Operating scalably in the data plane: The networking com-
munity has begun to lay the foundation for this aspect, through
fully programmable protocol-independent data planes (e.g.,
the Barefoot Tofino chipset [5] and Netronome NICs [30]) and
the languages to program them (e.g., P4 [6]). Through these
advances, data planes are now beginning to support in-band
measurements; coupled with distributed streaming analytics
platforms, there is huge potential for programmatic network
control, not only over forwarding (as SDN has enabled) but
also over the collection of measurement data. Section 4 de-
scribes research challenges and opportunities in these areas.
Operators have long wished for networks that are easier to
manage; developments in algorithms, machine learning, for-
mal methods, programming languages, and hardware design
encourage us to think about the larger goal of relieving the op-
erator’s burden as much as possible, and possibly altogether.
Indeed, the tools and technologies that could help us realize
these goals are emerging, but even the pieces of the puzzle are
not complete: for example, the needs for automated control
or inference place new requirements on machine learning al-
gorithms. A self-driving network thus represents a grand chal-
lenge both for networking and broadly for computer science.
As we come to depend on the Internet for nearly everything
we do, it is a grand challenge we must undertake.
2 Planning the Trip
The first component of a self-driving network is planning,
whereby a network operator specifies high-level policies and
a run-time system generates corresponding measurement, in-
ference, and control operations. Self-driving networks should
rely on a unified framework for specifying SLAs, network-
wide resource optimization, and packet transformations and a
runtime that can generate the distributed programs that run
on a heterogeneous collection of network devices to integrate
measurement, inference, and control.
2.1 Specify sophisticated network policies
We envision a network whereby a network operator can spec-
ify (1) the customer expectations (e.g., statistical guarantees
on latency and jitter); (2) network-wide goals (e.g., minimiz-
ing congestion); and (3) application functions and services
(e.g., network address translation, access control, intrusion
detection) that the network should satisfy.
Customer expectations (service-level agreements). Net-
work operators should specify service-level agreements
(SLAs) in terms of guarantees on network metrics (e.g., la-
tency, jitter, and DDoS response time) or user quality-of-
experience metrics, such as Mean Opinion Score (MOS) for
VoIP traffic or page load time for web browsing. Each SLA
should correspond to a particular subset of traffic, specified
by a predicate on packet header fields—or, better yet, on
higher-level names of Web sites (e.g., www.netflix.com) or
applications (e.g., video streaming)—and locations. Inter-
active applications could be assured that packet delay will
be less than 10 msec at least 99.9% of the time. SLAs may
correspond to contractual agreement with customers and can
drive monitoring (to detect when the network is at risk of
violating the guarantee), adaptation (to alleviate the problem
in the short term), and learning (to “learn” how to select
configurations that satisfy SLAs without underutilizing the
network). Today, service providers specify SLAs informally.
Although some preliminary research presents languages for
specifying SLAs [16, 18], these works stop short of “closing
the loop” on automatic monitoring, adapting, and learning.
Network goals (resource optimization). In addition to sat-
isfying SLAs for customers, network operators aim to satisfy
network-wide goals for running their networks efficiently and
reliably. These goals can be naturally expressed as optimiza-
tion problems, with objectives (such as minimizing conges-
tion) and constraints (such as traffic conservation or limits
on path length). Administrators should be able to specify
these goals directly as optimization problems. For example, a
common traffic engineering objective is to minimize a sum
over all links of some convex function f () of link utilization
(e.g., ∑` f (u`/c`)) where link utilization depends on the traf-
fic matrix (vi j, the volume of offered load from ingress i to
egress j) and the routing (ri j`), the fraction of traffic from
ingress i to egress j that traverses link `). That is, link uti-
lization is the sum of all parts of the traffic matrix that follow
paths traversing the link (i.e., u` = ∑i j ri j` ∗ vi j). The network
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operator should merely need to specify the objective function
and constraint—or, better yet, select these from a library of
options—rather than configure traffic measurement and rout-
ing directly. Rather than using a separate traffic engineering
tool, the network operator should be able to specify these
optimization goals in an integrated framework with other
policy goals (e.g., SLAs and application services). Recent
works [10, 27] take important steps in this direction, but stop
short of integrating SLAs or automatically driving network
measurement and inference decisions.
Services and functions (traffic transformations). Network
policies go beyond quantitative measures of load, perfor-
mance, and reliability, to include operations performed on
individual packets. Network policies may involve various
packet transformations, including network address translation
and access control, as well as operations on packet payload
(e.g., transcoding and encryption). In today’s networks, these
operations taking place on specific middleboxes, which re-
quires an operator to think at a “box level”, as opposed to spec-
ifying broader network goals. Network operators should be
able to specify traffic transformations at a high level and have
a runtime distribute the operations over network elements,
which may range from network switches to software virtual
machines to servers with hardware accelerators for specific
operations. Researchers have recently developed high-level
languages for specifying transformations of packets based
on header fields and their locations [1, 11, 12], including re-
cent work on stateful operations [3, 22]. Some recent work
also shows how to synthesize a distributed configuration of
network devices (e.g., OpenFlow or P4 switches) to realize
these policies while considering network-wide optimization
goals [3, 27]. These developments are important building
blocks for the more ambitious goal of a self-driving network,
which also entails (among other challenges) (1) specifying a
wider range of transformations that operate on packet payload
or across packet boundaries (e.g., transcoding, compression,
and encrypt); and (2) automatically “compiling” these speci-
fications to a heterogeneous collection of network devices.
2.2 Drive measurement, inference, & control
The run-time of a self-driving network should automatically
generate both the measurement queries and the control opera-
tions from a single high- level specification, rather than requir-
ing network operators to specify measurement and control
separately. The run-time system should realize the combined
functionality directly in the data plane whenever possible.
Below, we outline three example scenarios that can benefit
from tighter integration of measurement and control.
Minimizing network-wide congestion. A policy could spec-
ify an optimization goal of minimizing network-wide con-
gestion, as a sum over all links of a convex function of link
utilization (u`). Link utilization is itself a function of the
network routes and the traffic matrix. Given such a specifica-
tion, the runtime should automatically determine that it needs
to measure the traffic matrix (vi j and configure the routing
(ri j`) by solving an optimization problem. In practice, the
runtime must decide how often to collect the measurements
(and to what degree of accuracy), how often to change routing
(and how to minimize churn), and how to represent routing
decisions (based on the capabilities of the network devices).
Shifting traffic from congested peering point. When traffic
on a particular peering link exceeds a threshold, an operator
might want excess traffic to spill over to a secondary intercon-
nection link. Based on this policy, the runtime system should
monitor traffic load on the first link and decide whether and
how to balance traffic load. Rather than relying on a static
threshold, the decision might also rely on a higher-level QoE
metric (such as MOS, or even direct signaling from an ap-
plication about video bitrates or rebuffering) that triggers
monitoring of QoE for the associated traffic.
Detecting and blocking unwanted traffic. An operator
might outline a policy to detect and mitigate denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks; the policy might specify that the network
should rate limit traffic sent to a destination receiving a par-
ticular type of DNS response message from many distinct
senders. Based on this policy, the runtime should generate the
necessary monitoring queries and, based on the monitoring
results, rate-limit the suspicious traffic. Rather than detecting
DoS attacks using specific thresholds, the policy could spec-
ify a detection technique (e.g., sequential hypothesis testing
for port-scan detection) for identifying attacks.
3 Navigating in a Dynamic Environment
The network’s complexity and the dynamic nature of its under-
lying processes make machine learning algorithms a natural
tool for detecting, diagnosing, and mitigating disruptions.
Previous work has applied techniques from both machine
learning and user interaction to improve specific aspects of
network security [2, 7, 9] and performance [19, 29]. To date,
however, these techniques have been primarily “bolted on”
to existing designs, rather than incorporated directly into the
network’s control fabric. For example, many applications of
machine learning to network security have involved develop-
ment and (often offline) testing of algorithms with bulk traffic
traces; the next natural step is to integrate these types of infer-
ence and control algorithms into the network’s decision and
control fabric. Even applying existing learning algorithms
has often proven difficult, partially because existing network
protocols and technologies do not make it easy to obtain la-
bels for data samples. Conversely, today’s machine learning
algorithms are often not tailored for network data, which is
high-volume, distributed, and rapidly evolving; existing algo-
rithms also make it difficult to iteratively refine the features
used in a supervised learning algorithm (as might be required
for high-volume network traffic traces) or to perform complex
timeseries analysis.
In this section, we describe how techniques and insights
from both machine learning and user interaction can help
facilitate self-driving networks by: (1) incorporating machine
learning-based inference into the network so that, in many
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cases, the network can learn to run itself, removing many of
the decisions from network operators (Section 3.1); (2) incor-
porating input from applications and human users to better
improve the inputs to learning algorithms (Section 3.2).
3.1 Improving operations with learning
Networks should provide high availability, good application
performance, and security in the face of disruptions using
automated and semi-automated introspection. In contrast to
past approaches, which patch the existing network with point
solutions (e.g., middleboxes such as firewalls and spam filter-
ing appliances), we propose to make the functions provided
by these boxes inherent to the network itself. We will discuss
two areas of network management that are amenable to self-
driving operation: (1) satisfying performance requirements
and service-level agreements; and (2) automated detection
and mitigation of unwanted traffic (e.g., spam, DoS attacks).
Performance: Applications and service-level agreements.
Providing good network performance involves both reacting
to changing network conditions on short timescales. Pro-
viding good network performance for some application re-
quires understanding the relationships between application-
level metrics (e.g., video bitrate, rebuffering events) and what
can be measured from traffic as it traverses the middle of the
network. In other cases, an operator’s task may involve a
contractual service-level agreement (SLA)—including deter-
mining when network conditions might cause an SLA to be vi-
olated. When networks were simpler, it was possible to model
the behavior of (say) a TCP connection using closed-form
analysis, as well as to predict how certain network changes
(e.g., the change of routing protocol weights) might affect
the performance of an application. In today’s networks, how-
ever, this type of closed-form analysis is no longer tractable,
largely to the complexity of deployed networks and the many
interacting network components that collectively contribute
to the performance of the network and applications.
With the ability to collect, store, and analyze additional
data, networks can produce models that establish more com-
plex relationships between lower-level metrics such as utiliza-
tion and higher-level metrics such as streaming application
performance. For example, previous work has established
that it is possible to model how specific provisioning deci-
sions ultimately affect web search response time [29]. Past
work has demonstrated that it is possible to learn relation-
ships between lower-level network features (e.g., round-trip
latency) and application performance metrics (e.g., search
response time). Developments in the speed and sophistication
of these algorithms, coupled with advances in data-plane pro-
grammability, suggest that we should think about extending
these techniques to problems concerning monitoring and con-
trol over real-time performance, including application-level
performance guarantees and SLA monitoring.
Security: Unwanted traffic. Recent years have seen signifi-
cant advances in applications of machine learning to statistical
anomaly detection. Research has developed learning algo-
rithms to detect (and even predict) attacks based on analysis
of network traffic (from packet traces to IPFIX records) [17],
DNS queries [2] and domain registrations [8], and even BGP
routing messages [15]. Yet, most of these anomaly detec-
tion algorithms have only been demonstrated on offline traffic
traces; such demonstrations are useful for identifying features
for anomaly detection algorithms that run on stand-alone
network appliances; the prospect of a self-driving network
raises many more challenges and opportunities. One chal-
lenge involves tailoring these algorithms to operate in real
time, coupled with real-time action. For example, simple
regression models based on lightweight features could be ex-
ecuted in programmable switches that support customizable
feature extraction and computation (e.g., those based on the
Barefoot Tofino chipset [5]); we discuss this challenge further
in Section 4.2. An additional challenge involves developing a
new class of machine learning algorithms whereby an algo-
rithm could perform an initial rough classification based on
lightweight features (e.g., those based on metadata or coarse
statistics) and trigger collection of more heavyweight features
(e.g., those from packets) when classification is uncertain; we
explore this possibility in more detail in the next section.
3.2 Improving learning with better data
Networks should also be tailored to improve the quality of
input data provided to real-time inference and prediction al-
gorithms. For example, machine learning algorithms for
network security such as intrusion detection often train on
labeled data. Yet, for the domain of network security, ob-
taining labeled data is difficult: attacks are rare, threats are
dynamic, and new classes of threats and attacks are contin-
ually emerging. Similarly, identifying quality of experience
degradations often requires input from applications, users, or
both. In this section, we discuss how future networks might
be co-designed with learning algorithms to improve algorithm
accuracy, and to improve the quality and quantity of data that
provides input to these algorithms.
3.2.1 Improving model accuracy
Input from high-level policy and topology dependencies.
Conventional machine learning methods operate on offline
network traces, with little to no information about a network’s
structural dependencies and, as a result, must infer much
of what is already known before it can make any useful in-
ferences. New machine learning techniques might better
diagnose network problems by incorporating input from the
network topology (e.g., shared risk link groups) and the high-
level policy. Consider the case of detecting network faults
that affect availability. Unfortunately, although networks offer
a wealth of data, they lack a single framework that synthe-
sizes heterogeneous data to form hypotheses about underlying
causes. For example, the failure of a single link can cause link
alarms, routing changes, and traffic shifts. Rather than forc-
ing a machine-learning algorithm to infer these dependencies
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from observations of failure events, the self-driving network
can draw on information about the network topology.
Collecting additional data to improve model accuracy.
The accuracy of an inference model may also depend on
the type and quantity of data that is available. In many cases,
inference algorithms improve with additional data samples, or
data of a different type or granularity. A network that learns
could use a coarse detection algorithm based on network data
that is relatively lightweight or easy to collect (e.g., sampled
IPFIX logs, SNMP) to develop a classifier that might have a
false positive rate that is higher than acceptable. The output of
this classifier might trigger additional measurements—either
active measurements (e.g., probes) to and from different parts
of the network or, in some cases, more expensive packet cap-
tures that could provide more precise information about the
traffic (e.g., DNS query logs, timing information). The emer-
gence of technologies such as in-band network telemetry [13]
make it possible not only to write additional fine-grained in-
formation into packets, but also to generate probe traffic on
demand, making it possible to trigger fine-grained active and
passive measurements either end-to-end or from within the
network, should an algorithm need that information.
3.2.2 Improving data quality
Increasing the amount of labeled data. One of the chal-
lenges in applying machine learning to network performance
and security problems is the paucity of labeled data with
which to train these algorithms. The lack of labeled data
is fundamental to today’s networks, for several reasons:
Many interesting events are (1) rare (i.e., they do not hap-
pen frequently enough to generate a reasonable training set);
(2) emerging (i.e., they reflect a new class of threat or attack
that was previously unseen); or (3) dynamic. In the case of
network faults or failures, examples are rare: When a network
fault occurs, it is often due to a “one off” misconfiguration
of a network device that is interacting with other devices on
the network in unexpected (and previously unobserved) ways.
Other network faults may occur when physical hardware fails
or when a particular traffic pattern tickles an implementation
bug or configuration error. Unfortunately, because each fail-
ure is essentially unique, training based on past examples of
failures may not produce a classifier that can detect and diag-
nose future failures. A network that learns could incorporate
information directly from operators, from network configura-
tion, or perhaps even from users or applications to increase
the amount of labeled data that detection and inference algo-
rithms could use to train.
Input from users. Feedback from end users can help drive
additional passive and active measurements in the network.
Network operators typically have visibility into metrics in
the network itself, but these metrics are sometimes difficult
to map to user experience. We envision that these vantage
points might be better coupled through explicit feedback from
users that could subsequently trigger additional passive or
active measurements. One possibility, for example, is that
applications such as a Web browser have a button whereby
users could explicitly indicate poor application performance
(an “I’m frustrated” button). This feedback could result in
annotations on packets in application traffic that could trigger
additional passive or active measurements from switches.
Application developers occasionally poll end users about
the performance of individual applications (e.g., “How was
your experience on the last video call?”) through a technique
known as experience sampling. One challenge associated
with experience sampling concerns when to poll users about
their experiences: infrequent sampling can result in inade-
quate data about application performance; on the other hand,
sampling that is too frequent risks irritating the user or caus-
ing the user to submit dismissive responses. One possible
line of research is to use network measurements to drive and
automate experience sampling. For example, a programmable
switch in the network or an instrumented OS kernel might in-
dicate a degradation in conditions, such as higher packet loss
or latency, or a reduction in throughput; similarly, a server
might be able to witness elevated packet loss or latency in
a TCP stream. These conditions could serve as automated
triggers for polling a user about application experience; with
the appropriate integration, a network device or server could
generate a packet that could be automatically parsed by the
user’s operating system or browser to trigger the sample.
Input from applications and operating systems. End-user
applications often have precise information about the perfor-
mance they are experiencing (e.g., whether a rebuffer event
occurred, the fact that the video bitrate changed) but often
have no way of communicating this information to the net-
work. Similarly, the operating system may have additional
information about user engagement, such as whether an appli-
cation is running in the foreground and perhaps even whether
a user is engaging with the application (or device!) at all.
Communicating information both about application perfor-
mance and user engagement to the network could facilitate
more efficient use of network resources. An operating system
could include signaling information about application state
into network traffic flows, which the network could subse-
quently use to assign the traffic to a higher or lower priority
queue. Such a capability could be useful, for example, if
the network could determine that it could safely de-prioritize
a high-throughput video stream that the user was no longer
watching, even though the video continued to stream. Addi-
tional information from applications and operating systems,
such as TCP statistics, could also be used to label traffic
streams that could later be used as attributes in queries.
4 The Need for Speed
The capabilities in previous sections rely on real-time moni-
toring and prediction, streaming analytics on high-volumes
of network traffic, and line-rate processing functions ranging
from simple functions such as aggregation to more complex
functions like inference and prediction. Many research chal-
lenges lie ahead, in both designing and applying these build-
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ing blocks for self-driving networks—particularly in making
these functions scalable, distributed, and real-time.
4.1 Traffic analytics in the data plane
Flexible packet parsing, match-action pipelines, and the abil-
ity to maintain state both in the switch and on packet headers
can enable networks to support high-level measurement ab-
stractions.
Compact data structures. Programmable switches can per-
form arithmetic operations and maintain state in tables, allow-
ing switches to support compact data structures that maintain
statistics about packet streams. These data structures can sup-
port higher-level abstractions such as maintaining sets (e.g.,
Bloom filters), counts (e.g., counting Bloom filter or count-
min sketch), or counts of unique items (e.g., count distinct
sketch). Recent studies have shown how to support these
kinds of data structures on emerging switches [20, 26, 31];
more work lies ahead in optimizing for limited state, compu-
tational resources, and control bandwidth.
Piggybacking state on packets. Many networking tasks re-
quire operations across multiple hops. The ability to tag pack-
ets with state and update that state at subsequent hops enables
the data plane to support a range of powerful abstractions. For
example, a packet header could carry the version of network
policy applied to that packet (e.g., to support consistent policy
updates [25], sets or sequences (e.g., of next-hops, network
paths, or middleboxes for flexible traffic steering [21]); states
of a deterministic finite automaton to evaluate a regular ex-
pression on the properties of a packet and its path through the
network, to measure or control traffic based on these proper-
ties [23]; or the aggregation of traffic statistics across a path,
to collect path-level metrics such as maximum link utilization
or total queuing delay [13].
Simplifying joins with other datasets. Analysis often re-
quires joining traffic statistics with other data sets. For exam-
ple, joins can associate a packet’s destination address with its
autonomous system (by joining with routing table data), web-
site or application (by joining with DNS query logs), or the
end user (by joining with authentication server data). This in-
formation can facilitate aggregation of measurement data, the
routing and scheduling of traffic, and access control, based
on higher-level policies. In today’s networks, these joins
are cumbersome, often relying on coarse-grained timestamps
from different locations. The data plane can simplify the join
process in two ways. First, the data plane can perform the join
itself by analyzing and combining datasets simultaneously
or by maintaining an efficient representation of the second
dataset (e.g., a table of IP addresses associated with authen-
ticated users in a particular class). Second, a switch can tag
packets representing, for example, a location in the network
and associated timestamp, with information that can simplify
a subsequent join.
4.2 Prediction models in the data plane
As discussed in Section 3, machine learning has been applied
to a wide variety of network monitoring tasks, ranging from
performance monitoring to security. To date, however, many
of these models have been demonstrated and deployed in a
purely offline fashion: Traffic is collected from the network
in the form of packet captures, IPFIX records, or DNS query
logs and is used to train a detection model, which is also eval-
uated offline. Yet, many of these models incorporate simple
features—often ones that can be computed or inferred from
a single packet. Programmable switches could extract these
features from the packets in the data plane and even compute
regression functions based on these learned models, essen-
tially computing the prediction function in-line and making
real-time decisions about the nature of traffic in the network,
without ever requiring off-path analysis.
Consider a machine-learning based spam filter based on
network-level features such as the autonomous system of the
sending IP address, and the number of adjacent IP addresses
that have also sent emails [9]. Programmable switches could
compute these features inline and compute the weighted lin-
ear combination of individual feature characteristics to com-
pute the overall likelihood that a message is spam. Another
example involves botnet detection based on DNS lookups:
these classifiers detect abnormal features such as lookups that
are (among other features) lexicographically close together,
occur in large bursts over short time intervals, and are hosted
on authoritative DNS servers with known bad reputations.
A programmable switch could parse the DNS queries to ex-
tract these features and detect DNS lookups associated with
malicious activity in the switches themselves, without ever
requiring offline analysis.
5 Conclusion
The increasing performance, reliability, availability, and secu-
rity demands of modern networked applications are making
network management more important than ever. At the same
time, networks themselves have become far too complex
to manage using state-of-the-art approaches, which rely on
closed form models of network behavior and performance
at the level of individual protocols and devices. As a com-
munity, we must consider a fundamentally new approach to
network management that (1) relies instead on data-driven
models that can predict end-to-end network performance from
lower-level metrics; (2) couples measurement with real-time
control, eliminating the operator from the management con-
trol loop whenever possible. The past decade has laid the
groundwork for designing networks that drive themselves,
with technologies ranging from statistical anomaly detection
and learning-based troubleshooting tools to programmable
networks and compact data structures for line-rate algorith-
mics. We should aspire to use these building blocks to build
the self-driving networks that our applications now demand.
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